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TRADITION VERSUS DEMOCRACY IN THE 
KINGDOM OF TONGA* 
Stephanie Lawson 
Truth is what the chief says� and history is what the hi.ghest chief says. 
(Elizabeth Wood Ellem, quoted in Taliai 1990:215) 
Introduction 
Until relatively recently, what most struck outside observers of Tonga's conser­
vative sociopolitical structure was an image which exuded stability, contentment, 
and durability. The only remaining kingdom in the entire Pacific, Tonga had also 
been the only island cowitry to escape formal colonization during the period of 
European expansion in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and was therefore 
spared the turbulence which has typically accompanied most moves to 
decolonization. It is widely accepted that Tonga's ability to remain independent 
had been achieved largely through the development of a unitary, centralized 
political system, presided over by an indigenous monarch, and which inrorpo­
rated major elements of traditional sociopolitical organization. This system was 
entrenched through the promulgation in 1875 of a formal written constitution 
which established the monarchy and a landed nobility, and codified a set of 
principles and practices designed to sustain them as a ruling class. The superim­
position of certain Westminster-style institutions such as a prime minister, cabi­
net, legislature, judiciary, and electoral system, as well as a declaration of rights, 
gave the system some additional legitimacy in the European-dominated sphere of 
* lbis paper is a draft chapter for a book entitled Tradition versus Democracy in the Southwest 
Pacific. It was prepared in its present form for distribution at the Tongan History Conference, 
Nuku'alofa, July 1993. Comments and criticisms are welcome. 
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nineteenth century international politics, although these by no means added up to 
a democratic system of responsible government The concentration of power in 
the hands of the monarch, and the extent of privilege granted to the nobility wider 
the constitution, enshrined instead the basic principles associated with the de­
scending thesis of government. In this respect, there is little doubt that the 
provisions of the 1875 constitution resonated very clearly with traditional Tongan 
sociopolitical notions concerning the proper locus of political authority and 
legitimacy. 
Writing in 1983, one commentator held that 'if ''politics" is def'med as a 
"struggle for power", there is comparatively little of it in Tonga' (Afeaki 
1983:57). This accords with the image of stability referred to above and, at the 
time, was a reasonably accurate comment on the dynamics of Tongan politics. 
A decade later, however, a struggle for power has emerged very clearly, 
spearheaded by a determined pro-democracy movement which is pushing for 
significant reforms to the political system. There has so far been considerable 
resistance on the part of the ruling elite to these later developments, and the kind 
of democratic reforms advocated by the movement are unlikely to be realized 
in the immediate future. A much more remote possibility, however, is that the 
pro-democracy movement will simply wither away. The most recent general 
elections, held in early 1993, indicated growing support for its reformist 
aspirations-a trend which is unlikely to be reversed and which is bringing 
increasing pressure to bear on the ruling elite. 
Although its protagonists were originally concerned with a set of specific 
issues concerning corruption and accountability, the pro-democracy movement 
is now presenting a significant challenge to the whole basis of government in 
Tonga and the system of privilege which it supports. While having no wish to 
dispense with the monarchy per se (indeed, loyalty to the monarch remains 
something of an article of faith), the movement and its supporters are seeking 
to reform the political system so as to bring it in line with a much more 
democratic form of constitutional monarchy and responsible government. 
Apart from the matters concerning corruption and the almost complete lack of 
accountability in the present system, proponents are also concerned with wider 
issues of social justice and equity for ordinary Tongans in terms of access to 
land, equal opportunities, and public welfare. The response of the privileged 
establishment (that is, the royal family and �e nobility) has ranged from merely 
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attempting to ignore the movement and the pressures that it is bringing to bear, 
to some attempts at repression, persecution of pro-democracy leaders, intimi­
dation, and misleading propaganda. 
Some justifications for maintaining the status quo are based on fairly stan­
dard conservative arguments concerning the 'tried and tested' nature of 
longstanding institutions and the dangers inherent in meddling with these. 
Koloamatangi, reporting one conservative Tongan view on the viability of the 
present system, says that the supporting 'evidence' consists of little more than 
'the fact that the system has survived for over a thousand years' (Koloamatangi 
1991:12). Other arguments which emphasize the uniqueness and distinctive­
ness of Tonga's political institutions, and its basis in an equally unique body of 
tradition, clearly dfaw on nationalistic sentiments. While it may be acknowledged 
that this past was not entirely exemplary, it is nonetheless valued as a repository 
of importanticons through which the romantic imagery so essential to nationalism 
can be evoked. In this respect, the emphasis on distinctively Tongan images 
reflects the universal tendency of nationalist thinking to exalt the parochial 
elements of national differences and national individualities {Kohn 1982:9). 
Another strong nationalistic rallying point, and one which has helped to shroud 
present constitutional arrangements in a mantle of sanctity, is the notion referred 
to earlier that these arrangements were historically instrumental in securing 
Tonga against foreign domination in the past and should be defended as a matter 
of pride, gratitude, and loyalty in the present. 
At the core of many of these arguments, of course, lies an appeal to 
'tradition' which supports the view of Tongan culture purveyed through the 
nationalist images described above, and which seeks to anchor the legitimacy 
of the present political system in the remote past. As one observer has noted, 
however, Tongan 'tradition' is neither timeless nor homogeneous, and this is 
clearly evident in the record of internal struggles for power which characterized 
the centuries preceding the formal unification of Tonga in 1875 (Gailey 
1992:345). Many of the internal ruptures and changes were not the result of 
external influences, but arose almost entirely within Tonga's own political 
dynamics, thereby illustrating the point that pristine traditional systems do not 
necessarily, if ever, enjoy a state of natural equilibrium. Another commentator 
holds that the apparent stability of Tongan politics throughout most of the 
twentieth century is not a legacy of the distant past, 'but merely the projection 
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and amplification of an image which is historically shallow' (Campbell 1992:77). 
This raises once again the question of authenticity and the problem of invented 
as opposed to genuine traditions, the salience of which lies in the way the past 
may be used as a source of allegedly inviolable norms of political conduct in the 
Tonga present The critical evaluation of present arguments centring on the 
issue of tradition and democracy in contemporary Tonga must therefore be 
grounded in an understanding of the Tongan past 
The origins of the political system 
The islands which constitute the Kingdom of Tonga lie in three major groups 
(with numerous smaller islands around them) in the southwest Pacific region -
southeast of Fiji and southwest of Samoa - and have a total land area of just 
under 700 square kilometres. Excluding the outlying islands, the three main 
groups comprise the Tongatapu (southern) group; the Ha'apai (central) group; 
and the Vava'u (northern) group. Out of a total of aroWld 160 islands, some 36 are 
inhabited and these sustain a population of about 95,000 people. Archaeological 
evidence indicates that the Tongan islands were probably inhabited no later than 
1140 BC - a date determined for the earliest radiocarbon-dated material discov­
ered so far. Like the Fijians, the earliest inhabitants of Tonga were makers of the 
distinctive, elaborately decorated Lapita pottery (Douglas and Douglas 
1989:552). There are no Tongan migration myths to account for the first settling 
of the islands. Rather, the myths convey the belief that the earliest Tongan people 
were created in Tongatapu and that they were 'small, black and descended from 
worms' (Poulsen 1977:7-8). Other myths concerning the genealogical origins of 
the ruling dynasty say that the Tu'i Tonga line, through which the present 
monarch and many of the nobles trace their ancestry, commenced with 'Aho'eitu, 
believed to have descended from the skies following the union of his divine father 
with his Tongan mother (Cummins 1977:64). Although, as one observer notes 
wryly, his method of arrival is questionable (Ledyard 1982:15), fairly reliable 
orally preserved genealogies support 'Aho'eitu as the actual founder of the dy­
nasty in the tenth century AD (Cummins 1977:63). 
Although there is little to tell us about the sociopolitical relations of the 
earliest Tongans, there are indicators pointing to the probability that the Tu'i 
Tonga line was founded by alien chiefly lineages penetrating the group and 
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superimposing a non-indigenous hierarchy on an earlier system. This is sup­
ported in part by the myth of 'Aho'eitu as a progeny of the sky, which implies 
the supremacy of an invading ruler, as well as by aspects of local chiefly customs 
which suggest the survival of forms from the pre-Tu'i Tonga era (Gunson 
1977:91-92). Williamson's account of Tonga's early political system refers to 
a group of conquering 'Tangaroans' who, having subjugated the original 'pre­
Tangaroan' people, adopted the posture of divinity while at the same time 
assigning commoner origins to the soil-hence the belief that they were created 
from worms (Williamson 1924/1967:138-41). The alien origins of the ruling 
Tongan dynasty is further supported by anthropological studies which have 
elaborated the theory of the 'domesticated stranger-king' .1 Another commen­
tator suggests that the idea of 'descent from the sky' was commonly applied to 
any foreign arrival, including that of the early explorers and missionaries. It is 
further suggested that the divinity of the Tu'i Tonga line may not have been 
properly established in local lore until the late eighteenth century when a new 
myth, implying supernatural legitimacy, became necessary to bolster the 
weakening authority of the incumbent titleholder. Thus the 'descent from the 
sky' trope may have been transformed from one which simply referred to a 
foreign arrival to one which attributed divine origin to the Tu'i Tonga line 
(Ferdon 1987:30). 
Whatever the precise origins of the Tu'i Tonga line and the nature of the 
myths surrounding the ruling dynasty, it is certainly clear that a hierarchy of 
chiefly control developed from the eleventh century onwards and extended its 
control throughout the islands. The pattern which emerged, and which has left 
its traces in contemporary Tonga, indicates that a number of chiefs exercised 
effective control at the various local levels while paying homage and allegiance 
to the Tu'i Tonga. This figure, standing at the apex of the entire system, retained 
the spiritual and secular leadership of the islands as a whole (Cummins 
1977:64). This lasted as a fairly well-centralized, unitary system until the 
closing decades of the fifteenth century when the twenty-third Tu'i Tonga, 
Takalaua, was assassinated. His son, Kau 'ulufonua, instituted major changes in 
the political structure designed to avoid a recurrence of violence aimed at the 
person of the Tu'i Tonga. He split the duties of the Tu'i Tonga by creating anew 
title, Tu'i Ha'atakalaua, which he gave to his younger brother. This title was to 
carry with it the responsibility for the secular, practical aspects of government 
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In a retreat from the more dangerous role of political leader, Kau'ulufonua 
retained only his religious functions, although he preserved all the honour and 
privileges that accrued to the rank of Tu'i Tonga. Nonetheless, the separation of 
power meant that the position of the Tu'i Tonga was weakened. As Goldman 
(1970:303) remarks, power was an attribute of hierarchy as well as a means by 
which hierarchy was sustained. When power balances were disturbed, there­
fore, as in the division of the Tu'i Tonga's powers and responsibilities, the end 
result was not its preservation, but rather the opposite. 
Further important developments occured in the seventeenth century when 
the sixth Tu'i Ha'atakalaua created another new title, Tu'i Kanokupolu, which he 
assigned to his son, N gata, with the intention that he exercise firmer control over 
the troublesome Hifiho district. Through a combination of internal tensions, as 
well as some influence from increasing contact with external forces, this 
tripartite system began to disintegrate in the eighteenth century. By the nine­
teenth century, far-reaching formal constitutional changes took place. These 
were more clearly the result of missionary influence (by now firmly established 
in the islands), and had the effect, amongst other things, of breaking down much 
of the localized traditional chiefly system (Cummins 1977:64-67; Ledyard 
1982:18; Marcus 1977:212). 
The period of internal political instability and change described above was 
accompanied by something of a decline in traditional religious practices. 
Cummins (1977:77) writes that: 
The modifications of the Kingship in the fifteenth century into sacred and 
secular divisions highlights the radical political and religious changes that 
were taking place. The murder of Takalaua was itself a desperate act of 
irreligion. Kau'ulufonua, the son who avenged the assassination of 
Takalaua, is reputed to have entrusted his back to the protection of the 
gods in a battle, and when wounded exclaimed: 'The gods are fools'. 
During the civil disturbances at the close of the eighteenth century sacred 
houses were in some instances destroyed, sanctuaries violated, gods and 
priests abused and ignored, and the Tu'i Tonga himself opposed in battle 
by his subjects. 
The sociopolitical system 
As in other Polynesian societies, Tongan society to the time of the 187 5 constitu­
tion was based on a complex, hierarchical system of chiefly rule. Its monarchical 
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structure wider the headship of the Tu'i Tonga, however, was quite unique in the 
Pacific, and some imd it comparable only with distant systems of the kind which 
supported the Dalai Lama and the Japanese Emporer (Latukefu 1974:1 ). From all 
accollllts, the chiefly system was one of the most rigid and severely authoritarian 
in the region. One commentator remarks that Tonga had the character of a 'chain 
of islands bound together by the battles of warrior chiefs who could at will, and 
with impWlity, club any commoner to death' (Ledyard 1982:70). Another points 
to the degree of chiefly control in temlS of resources: 'The chiefs owned all the 
land and could take what they pleased from their tenants and even kill them', and 
further: 'The arbitrary power and cruelty of some of the chiefs is manifest from 
the early accounts. The Tu'i Kanokupolu Tukuaho cut off one arm from each of 
his cooks and Ulukalala tortured and drowned his political enemies' (Gifford 
1929:127). Goldman's analysis holds that in order to demonstrate its awesome­
ness, chiefly power was often exercised to the very margins of propriety and that 
the requisite meekness of the lowly orders provided a suitable contrast with 
displays of power by the higher strata (1970:302). 
On the other hand, Latukefu (1975:9) notes that the key to the socio­
economic system was an underlying principle of reciprocity which, when 
operating at its best, provided a stable and relatively peaceful lifestyle. He also 
says that by virtue of the fact that commoners served their chiefs with loyalty and 
devotion, and made their tributes as required, chiefs in these circumstances 
would find it difficult to deprive their people of land or otherwise abuse their 
authority. The reciprocity of obligations and duties (fatongill) on the part of the 
chief lends a more humane touch to the less appealing images described above 
(see Biersack 1990:49). Nonetheless, thereal essence of the order was undoubt­
edly a matter of total, unquestioning obedience (fakaa,paa,pa) on the part of 
Tongan commoners (Niu 1988:308).2The structural inequalities with which the 
sociopolitical system was suffused reached into every aspect oflife. The forms 
adopted in artwork, for example, unambiguously reflected and deimed the 
dimensions of social inequality. They permeated the entire range of artistic 
activities which included music, dance, tattooing, woodwork, and the production 
and decoration of bark cloth, mats, baskets and ornaments (Kaeppler 1990:59-
61 ). 
Given these factors, it is hardly surprising that contemporary democratic 
principles have little resonance with traditional ones. As Helu (1992: 140) 
points out, values such as equality and social justice have, as a result, been 
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enormously difficult to approach in practice. This is reflected in a Tongan 
expression which encapsulates the anti-equality ethic very clearly: Oua e tangi 
ke tatau na'a 'a Taufa'ahau (do not aspire to be equal lest Taufa'ahau be 
angered). At times, however, others have pointed to concepts which have some 
resonance with more liberal ideas. Hau'ofa, for example, maintains that the word 
fa 'iteliha (unrestrained) is a unique Tongan term which expresses something of 
a democratic ethos in traditional Tongan culture (cited in Fonua 1992:1 1). But 
there is little doubt that whatever traces of liberal elements may be detected 
through such conceptual expressions, these have been almost completely 
dominated by what Hau' ofa has elsewhere called 'the basic authoritarian per­
sonality of Tonga' (Hau'ofa 1978: 1 64  ). Furthermore, there are few grounds for 
believing that Tonga would have developed as a liberal society through a 
process of 'natural evolution': this could only come about through the impact 
of external influences (Helu 1992:140). 
Tonga's polytheistic religious belief system naturally complemented the 
sociopolitical hierarchy. Every chief was possessed of some degree of super­
natural power in the form of mana which was derived directly from the gods, 
and the higher the chiefly position, the greater the mana. In addition, chiefs were 
surrounded by a system of taboos (tapu) and, again, the higher the chief, the 
more complex the taboos. But while commoners were required, on pain of death 
or at the least a severe beating, to observe customary laws and taboos very 
closely, the obligations of chiefs in this respect were, depending on rank and 
circumstance, less strict. Following the pattern described above, it seems that 
the higher the chiefly rank, the greater the freedom to violate taboos without 
incurring supernatural wrath. It is also evident that murder, theft, and adultery 
were regarded as offences only when committed against a person of equal or 
superior rank, or if the stolen object was sacred (Latukefu 1975:13).  In all these 
respects, the Tu'i Tonga enjoyed the greatest privileges. He was also distin­
guished from all other Tongan males in that he was not tattooed, nor did he 
undergo the otherwise common circumcision operation. The ceremonies sur­
rounding special events in his life (and death), such as marriage and burial, were 
much more elaborate than those of lesser rank. Moreover, he was not addressed 
in the ordinary language of Tonga, but in a special honorific language (Ledyard 
1982: 16). This practice persists to the present day alongside another special 
language level for the nobility. Thus the three broad levels of the contemporary 
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class system, viz royalty, nobility, and commoners, correlate with three speech 
registers each containing a different, class-specific vocabulary (Karaliku 
1977:48). The pre-Christian belief system described here clearly conforms to 
the type which Weber elaborated in his formulation of 'traditionalist authority' ,  
namely, that the cluster of norms associated with the system were, at least for 
the commoners, considered sacred and inviolable and that infractions 'would 
result in magical or religious evils' (Weber 1948:296). 
· 
Relations between chiefs and gods were mediated by priests, which neces­
sarily empowered the latter �o the extent that they were second only to the chiefs 
themselves in terms of political influence (Latukefu 1974:4). Each lineage 
appears to have had its own deity with a priest presiding over rituals and the 
f akahaeleanga (sacred possessions of the god). The aid sought through the 
priest was at times accompanied by the offering of imger joints or even human 
sacrifice (Gifford 1929 :317-18). An aspect of religious belief that illustrates the 
degree of alienation between the chiefs and the common people within the social 
structure concerns the Tongan version of paradise (puloto ). Entry to puloto was 
open only to the chiefly class, while it was believed that commoners turned into 
vermin after they died-hence theterm.kainangaefonua (eaters of the soil) was 
applied to the lower class. Furthermore, there were no moral conditions attached 
as eligibility criteria for entry to puloto, so chiefs gained automatic admittance 
regardless of their conduct during mortal life, while the exclusion of commoners, 
no matter how exemplary their behaviour, was apparently absolute (Latukefu 
1974:8-9). Beliefs of this kind were clearly antithetical to Christian teachings, 
and the subsequent inculcation of the latter among the Tongan people necessarily 
produced a profound change in their entire way of thinking about the mecha­
nisms of retribution and reward. 
Associations linking the ruling strata with divine power and privilege have 
nonetheless continued to influence the way in which the contemporary royalty 
and nobility is viewed, and there remains a general belief that these higher 
classes are 'divinely pre-conditioned' as social and political leaders (Afeaki 
1983 :57). A general political proplem with the ethos surrounding the ruling 
class in the present era concerns the apparent difficulty that many ministers and 
nobles have in accepting direct questioning, let alone the criticism that is 
normally part and parcel of a parliamentary system. Thus, while there are no 
constitutional impediments to freedom of speech- indeed such freedom is 
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guaranteed by the constitution - there are very considerable social inhibitions. 
This situation is further reinforced by a degree of self-interest on the part of those 
who may be subject to criticism and who have so far resisted calls for 
accountabilit (Hills 1991a:8). In summary, it is evident that the religious belief 
system was closely interwoven with and provided strong support for the 
traditional Tongan sociopolitical hierarchy and that its influence is manifest 
today, among other things, in the cultural norms and values regulating 
interaction between the different strata. The impact of Christianity, however, 
was decisive both for formal political developments and for diluting, at least to 
some extent, the ethos of the rigid class system with certain principles of equality 
and freedom. 
Christian conversion 
The decline in traditional religion noted earlier accelerated very quickly with the 
eventual establishment of Christian missions in Tonga There had been sporadic 
contact with Europeans (papalangi) since the seventeenth century and early 
visitors included Tasman and, later, Cook whose early impressions led him to call 
Tonga the 'Friendly Isles'. By the end of the eighteenth century, a few Europeans 
including sailors, some escaped convicts from New South Wales, and mission­
aries, were effectively resident in the islands. Through trade and other means, 
Tongans were able to acquire European goods, including weapons with which 
local wars were prosecuted with increasing fatalities (Gailey 1987:146). The 
petty wars of this period, however, retained the character of previous internal 
skirmishes in that were concerned largely with the control of local resources and 
were not necessarily provoked by external pressures. In any event, the scale and 
intensity of these wars was as nothing compared with the later civil wars which 
exhibited all the characteristics of holy crusades. These wars, which were essen­
tially over Christian conversion and political tmification, were finally to draw the 
islands into a centralized state structure presided over by a monarch and a landed 
nobility (ibid.:169). 
Initial attempts to establish Christian missions in the islands had met with 
dismal failure. The earliest missionaries, having arrived in Tongatapu under the 
sponsorship of the London Missionary Society in 1797 with high hopes of 
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bringing salvation and civilization to the Tongan people, were forced to leave 
in despair after some had been killed and.the rest forced to flee their initial base. 
The Wesleyan Methodists who followed in 1 826 enjoyed greater success. 
Perhaps their most fortunate choice was to attach themselves to the paramount 
chief of Ha'apai, Taufa'ahau, who was later to become King George Tupou I. 
Christian conversion for leading chiefs in the ensuing period became vecy much 
a matter of political expediency. For example, Gailey's analysis points to the 
fact that Taufa'ahau, who did not convert until 1 831 ,  manipulated both custom­
ary and European means of consolidating power, . and did not allow the 
missionaries to conduct a significant proselytizing effort until he was convinced 
of its utility in assisting his own efforts at political consolidation (ibid. :179). 
Latukefu also writes that after some initial resistance, other important chiefs 
who had suffered defeats in some of the ongoing power struggles became 
disillusioned with what they perceived as the failure of their own gods to assist 
them, and began to question the validity and efficacy of the old ways. They also 
came to believe that 'the way to achieve their ambitions of acquiring the wealth, 
knowledge, and power of the white man was to adopt his religion, for he must 
have acquired all these things from his superior and more powerful god' 
(Latukefu 1977: 124-25). As for the lower classes, they had much to gain, 
including souls and the prospect of an afterlife, both of which had been denied 
them by the old religion (ibid. : 129). 
The subsequent spread of Christianity was relatively quick, and less than 
thirty years after the Wesleyans first established their base, virtually the whole 
of Tonga was brought within the fold, although not all as W esleyans. In the years 
following Taufa'ahau's conversion, wars continued between various factions, 
by now attracting the designation of Christian and heathen. This was partially 
resolved by the conversion to Catholicism of many remaining heathens on 
Tongatapu by a lately arrivedparty ofFrenchRomanCatholic priests. By farthe 
greatest capacity for influence, however, undoubtedly lay with the Wesleyans. 
This was partly due to its local development as a church which assimilated the 
key characteristics of the Tongan social structure. It was, in effect, 'a royal and 
chiefly church, with seats in the sanctuary alongside its ministers for those who 
bore the titles of royalty, nobility or high local rank' (Garrett 1982:80). And 
when Taufa' ahau (using the title of King George3) issued a code of laws for 
1 1  
Tonga in 1 838, the opening lines of the proclamation clearly indicated the higher 
source of his authority: 'It is of the God of Heaven and earth that I have been 
appointed to speak to you . .. '. 4 
It is evident from the nature of the wars during this period that the concerns 
of warfare referred to above had now shifted, under the impact of the new 
religious influence, from traditional issues to a battle between the forces for 
centralization and those who opposed it. The latter, however, were in the end 
unsuccessful in maintaining the status quo and, by the closing decades of the 
century, the Christian chiefs and their retainers would become a new landed 
nobility while Taufa' ahau, as George Tupou I, assumed the position of sover­
eign (Gailey 1987:171). The last battle of the era was fought and won in 1852 
with Taufa'ahau emerging clearly as the victor. Having established himself as 
the most powerful Tongan of the time, he was soon toimpose fonnal constitutional 
political uniformity over the islands and develop the centralized kingdom which 
exists today. 
Constitutional development 
There is no doubt that the dominant W estem powers of the nineteenth century 
regarded their own forms of government as the only appropriate models for any 
cowitry aspiring to the status of a 'civilized' nation, and that those ·backward 
nations which had not managed to develop the appropriate imitative institutions 
required both protection and political salvation - usually under the mantle of 
colonization. As Ferdon suggests, the sociopolitical system of 'traditional' Tonga 
hardly conformed to the Western ideal of civilized government, and the develop­
ment of a 'constitutional monarchy' has therefore been seen as a vital factor in 
Tonga's relatively successful resistanre to foreign control (Ferdon 1987:286-87). 
The constitution that was eventually promulgated or 'granted' to the people 
in 1 875 by Tupou I was preceded by a series of edicts commencing with the 
Vava'u Code of 1 838. This first code limited the arbitrary power of the local 
chiefs and established, at least ii) a formal sense, the rule of law. In addition, it 
sought to establish the supremacy of the monarch. Ledyard (1982:57) observes 
that in formulating the legal provisions of the Code, the only assistance available 
was that of the Wesleyan missionaries and, as a result, it is permeated with 'both 
the influence of the Bible and of the typical, lower middle-class English thinking 
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of the time'. This was followed by the Second Vava 'u Code of 1 850 which 
elaborated many of the principles and practices established in the earlier code, 
further limited the power of the chiefs, touched briefly on land tenure, and 
defined the positions of the judges. The Emancipation Edict of 1862, as its title 
suggests, freed the commoners from the effective serfdom they had endured for 
centuries. One missionary response was to herald the new edict as the 'Magna 
Carta of Tonga' ( 'Tonga Circuit Report 1 862' , in Cummins 1972:153). It also 
contained a number of other measures, including a provision subjecting the 
monarch to the rule of law - an indication of how secure his position as 
widisputed ruler of Tonga had become (Latukefu 1974:206). 
The constitution of 1875, which was strongly influenced by the Hawaiian 
constitution of 1852 and precepts of British constitutionalism, codified and 
expanded on the body of law established by the various codes referred to above. 
One important change brought about by the successive edicts, and more firmly 
enforced through the 1875 constitution, was the breakdown of local chiefly 
power. Most existing titled chiefships were not actually abolished, but were 
simply ignored by the new legal framework. Many chiefs became 'eiki si'i (petty 
chiefs) who, as Marcus tells us, were still able to pass on their titles and sit at the 
head of their kava circles, but fowid themselves effectively reduced to a status 
little higher than the bulk of the commoners around them This resulted in one 
part of traditional Tongan society being more or less levelled rather than 
preserved in the new order (Marcus 1989:212). This was a logical sequence to 
the previous Codes and the Emancipation Edict which had done much to 
improve the lot of Tongan commoners and release them from the worst 
impositions of their traditional servile status. . 
At the other end of the social spectrum, however, a select group of chiefs 
was chosen to become a new landed aristocracy or nobility. Thus Tupou I, 
although seemingly anxious to reduce the power of many chiefs in the old order 
and introduce a more egalitarian structure at the mass level, created at another 
level an elite invested with enormous privilege. In what is widely referred to as 
a 'paradox and seeming blunder', the king appointed thirty chiefs as hereditary 
landed nobles (nopell) as well as six ceremonial attendants with the traditional 
title of matapule who were also granted their own hereditary estates, thus 
'carving out a permanent and constitutionally defined sector of traditional 
privilege in the new society' (ibid. :215). At the time, however, it seems that the 
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formal creation of the noble class was necessary to dampen the opposition of the 
most powerful chiefs to the new order, and to gain their loyalty and support 
(Latukefu 1974:213). 
With respect to the structure of power encoded in the constitution, it has 
been pointed out that certain desirable balancing elements common to both 
English and traditional Tongan law were largely omitted from the document. 
For example, no formal provision was made for the reciprocity implicit in the 
relationships between chiefs and commoners in the earlier Tongan order and, 
while the powers of the higher chiefs were clearly spelled out and made 
enforceable, the document made no mention of chiefly obligations, let alone 
provisions for their enforcement Furthermore, the lineages of the royal families 
and nobles were .no longer dependent on the recognition and support of the 
people -they now held their positions by virtue of introduced concepts of legal 
succession enshrined in the constitution (Powles 1990:145). 
Briefly, the constitution, which survives to the present day with only a few 
amendments, is set out in three parts. The first, entitled 'Declaration of Rights', 
prescribes the general principles by which the monarch, judiciary, and govern­
ment are to conduct themselves. The second part, concerning 'Form of Gov­
ernment', details the role and structure of the Privy Council (over which the 
monarch presides and which is the highest executive body although it has 
limited legislative functions), the cabinet (consisting of all ministers and the 
governors of Ha'apai and Vava'u, and presided over by the prime minister), and 
the Legislative Assembly (composed of all ministers, the representatives of the 
nobles, and the representatives of the people). It also sets out the method of 
ministerial appointment, the structure and role of the judiciary, and the law of 
succession to the throne, which was now to be based strictly on primogeniture. 
The third part, 'The Land', establishes the principles of inheritance pertaining 
to estates, deals with general laws of succession relating to property, and also 
contains a permanent prohibition on the sale of land to foreigners (see The 
Constitution o/Tonga reproduced in Wylie 1967). 
In general terms, the constitution locates the ultimate source .of authority in the person of the monarch. This is reflected in certain prerogatives reserved to 
him or her; for example, the prime minister, as well as all the other ministers, are 
appointed by the monarch who is not required to consult with any other person 
on the matter. This means that the ministers are directly responsible not to the 
parliament (or, by implication, to the people), but to the monarch (Hills 1991 a:5-
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6). The pre-eminent status and powers of the monarch which are recognized 
emphatically by the constitution have been summarized by Powles as follows: 
1. It was the reigning Monarch who, in 1875, "granted" the Constitution 
to the people of Tonga. 
2. The sovereignty of the Monarch is declared in terms of the absolute 
authority (''Pule") to govern Tonga and its people (clauses 17, 31 and 
41). 
3. An important aspect of this authority is the Monarch's power over the 
Prime Minister and Ministers who are responsible to the Monarch for 
administering the government. The Monarch may dismiss and ap­
point at any time (clause 51 ). 
4. All land is the property of the Monarch (clauses 44 and 104); and such 
estates will revert to the Monarch in the absence of an heir (clause 
112). 
5. The Constitution gurantees perpetual sue.cession to the lineage of the 
Monarch (clause 32). 
6. The reigning Monarch cannot be impeached (clause 41). 
7. The Constitution which protects the Monarch cannot be changed 
without his consent (clauses 67 and 69) (Powles 1992). 
Unlike the Westminster system, on which Tonga's governmental structures 
are superficially based, the Tongan monarch therefore continues to enjoy a great 
deal of real power. In Britain, the formal constitutional niceties of sovereign 
privilege simply represent the remnants of a long-abandoned 'working' mon­
archy. To date, however, almost none of the conventions which limit the formal 
sovereignty of the monarch, and which are normally associated with the theory 
of responsible government, have evolved (even though theconstitutiondoes not 
necessarily constitute an absolute barrier to such development). Current gov­
ernmental practice, then, is certainly contrary to all the principles of modern 
democratic government as developed in the West, and clearly contributes to the 
lack of accountability complained of by the present pro-democracy movement 
(Hills 1991a:8). 
The Declaration of Rights, however, does suggest some desire on the part 
of the constitution's authors to give effect to certain principles associated with 
more modem liberal values, and has been instrumental in securing the important 
right to freedom of speech in the contemporary struggle for reform. Even so, 
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there remain considerable non-legal obstacles to exercising such rights because 
of the social inhibitions referred toi)reviously. The clause guaranteeing equality 
before the law is phrased in unqualified liberal tenns: 'There shall be but one law 
in Tonga, one for the Chiefs, and commoners, and Europeans and Tongese. No 
laws shall be enacted for any special class to the de�nt of another class; but 
one law equally for all persons residing in this land' (The Constitution o/Tonga, 
Part 1 :4 ). In general terms, however, there is no provision for the enforcement 
of all the 'freedoms' and 'rights' set out in the constitution. Moreover, the clause 
which declares the principle of equality before the law is embedded in a 
constitutional document which itself recognizes and entrenches (and effectively 
legalizes) traditional inequalities of privilege and status (Powles 1990:155). 
Another important aspect of the 187 5 constitution is the firm belief that its 
promulgation effectively secured Tonga against foreign domination and colo­
nization. This is a common theme in the literature as well, and virtually all 
commentators affirm the apparent efficacy of the 1875 constitution in this 
respect. Gailey, for example, refers to developments in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century as being linked to 'efforts to stave off British annexation' 
(Gailey 1992:322). Similarly, Latukefu describes the 1875 constitution as 
marking the culmination of a process by which Tupou I was able to bring to 
Tonga 'the type of legal and constitutional machinery which would enable her 
to gain recognition from the civilised nations andmaintain her own independent 
and stable nation' (Latukefu 1974:209). Although Tupou I was on record as 
wanting some form of British protection during the timeof his earlier difficulties 
with rival chiefs, this by no means indicated a desire to come under foreign 
control of any kind. One indication of this was his steadfast refusal to sell any 
land to foreigners. He had also stated that: 'I verily wish to become a friend of 
Britain; in friendly alliance .. .  but it is not in my mind, nor in the mind of my 
people, that we should be subject to any other people or kingdom in this world' 
(quoted in Morrell 1960:312). Niu argues, however, thatthethreatofannexation 
in 1875 was no greater than it had been in earlier periods and that the 'granting' 
of the constitution by Tupou I was inspired more by a desire to reach a 
compromise between the chiefs than for external reasons of state (Niu 1988:306). 
Whatever the reasons, it is nonetheless certain that the ability ofTupou I to bring 
the whole of the islands under central control and establish a national constitu­
tion was a significant factor in maintaining Tonga's fonnal indpendence 
throughout the period of colonial domination in the Pacific. 
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This independence, however, was qualified to a considerable extent by the 
later imposition of British protectorate status which the 1875 constitution was 
unable to guard against. This came about partly as a result of further internal 
complications in Tonga, at least some of which can be attributed to the Reverend 
Shirley Balcer, originally a Wesleyan but later the instigator of the brealcaway 
Free Church of Tonga. Baker had been very close to Tupou I, and was the 
principal drafter of the 1875 constitution. His flirtations with German connections 
in the region as well as his political intrigues within the islands eventually led 
to his removal from Tonga under a British High Commission Order in Council 
on the grounds that he was a clanger to 'the good order of the kingdom' (Garrett 
1982:80). The domestic difficulties in Tonga, which only increased with the 
passing of Tupou I and the succession of Tupou II, as well as Britain's desire to 
secure a sphere of influence in the Pacific against other foreign interests, 
eventually led to the establishment of British protectorate status and a 'Treaty 
of Friendship' for the islands in 1900. This was followed by a supplementary 
agreement five years later, the terms of which 'fell just short of annexation' 
(Fusitu'a anq Rutherford 1977:187). Tonga was now well within the 'British 
orbit' of influence in the Pacific, especially since Tonga's foreign relations and 
internal finances (which had been particularly chaotic) were firmly under 
British direction (Grattan 1963 :391 ). Full independence was not regained until 
1970 when Tonga's 'protected status' was revoked and_ Tonga resumed full 
responsibility for defence and external affairs. The Treaty still exists, but it now 
simply expresses a desire for 'perpetual peace and friendship' between Tonga 
and Britain. Tonga remains a member of the Commonwealth (Survey of British 
and Commonwealth Affairs 1970, 4(14) :606). 
The constitutional system described here has been characterized as 'a 
masterful example of the integration of modem and traditional ideas of gov­
ernment' (Ferdon 1987:287). This depends, of course, on the perspective from 
which it is viewed. For its time, it certainly provided a much more liberal 
political framework than traditional Tongan structures allowed Its 'modernity', 
however, has long since been eclipsed by the tide of events in the outside world, 
and it is often perceived by foreigners as maintaining an essentially feudal 
structure of power (Hills 1991a:1 5). Also, as Powles points out, the Tongan 
constitution today is very much out of step with international opinion, and 
certainly with the standards set by the Trusteeship Council and Decolonization 
Committee of the United Nations forty years ago: '[I]f Tonga had been a former 
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colony seeking independence under UN supervision, the world body would not 
have permitted Tonga to become independent without a more representative 
electoral system' (Powles 1992:3). But while the constitution cannot now be 
regarded as 'modem' in a meaningful way, neither is it a document which 
reflects an authentic, pristine traditional order. Marcus points out that the body 
of Tongan tradition that is under challenge today is an amalgam of earlier 
Tongan culture with a particular version of papalangi culture. In short, it is a 
'compromise culture' thatisnow being defended as angafaka Tonga (the Tongan 
way) (Marcus 1977:210-11). 
The reign of Queen Salote Tupou m 
The daughter of Tupou II, Salote was born in the year of the Protectorate and 
came to the throne on the death of her father just eighteen years later. She reigned 
for almost half a century during which period she wOlked hard to consolidate the 
political system established by her great-great-grandfather, and the impression of 
Tongan political stability referred to at the beginning of this discussion can be 
attributed almost exclusively to Salote's efforts. Her ability to strengthen the 
institution of monarchy has been attributed partly to her personal popularity, and 
partly to her political acumen. 
One of Salote's best known and most admired capacities related to her 
intimate knowledge of individual subjects and their family relations through 
their genealogies (hohoko ). Marcus has pointed out that exclusive knowledge 
has always been a source of chiefly power in Polynesia, especially in relation to 
genealogical knowledge (Marcus 1989:201 ). The genealogies themselves not 
only provide an intelligible chronology for the interpretation of important 
historical events, but also embody Tongan notions of rank, seniority, status, and 
power (Herda 1990:21). By placing all persons and groups within a grid of 
historic chiefly genealogies, Salote was eventually able to identify each and 
every one of her subjects - no mean feat when dealing with a population of 
around 40,000. Salote' s cultivation of genealogical learning also involved the 
selection and training of particular nobles, thereby ensuring that the special 
knowledge would not be lost (Marcus 1989:201). When founding the Tongan 
Traditions Committee in 1952, a body dedicated to the preservation of genea­
logical and other traditional forms of knowledge (or knowledge of traditional 
18  
forms), she declared to parliament that 'the customs of the people are its 
heritage' (Wood and Wood Ellem 1977:194). But the kind of heritage recalled 
through genealogical knowledge is one which can only be expressed in the 
idiom of chiefliness. As Herda points out, commoners of the pre-Christian era 
had no social or political reason to remember their ancestors. One implication 
of this is that genealogical credentials were important only to those who needed 
to establish legitimacy in a sphere of chiefly power and control in which 
commoners were, by definition, completely irrelevant. Herda goes on to argue 
that the 'traditional' Tongan past, being an exclusively chiefly domain, denies 
commoners a place in history because they have no means of access to theirnon­
elite ancestors (Herda 1990:27). 
Latukefu (1967: 159) suggests that Salote' s own impressive genealogy was 
an important factor in securing the intense loyalty and respect of her subjects. 
She was directly descended from two of the three major dynasties. Her 
connection to the Tu'i Kanokupolu line was through Tupou I while her mother 
was the great-granddaughter of Laufilitonga, the last Tu'i Tonga. This was 
reinforced by her marriage to Viliami Tungi, heir to the third dynasty of the Tu'i 
Ha'atakalaua, whom she also appointed to the premiership in 1923. While 
Salote' s own marriage was not simply a matter of uniting the highest lineages 
for politically instrumental purposes, there is no question that Salote cultivated 
what Marcus calls 'a politics of kinship and arranged marriages' by which 
means she 'upgraded the status of selected titleholders by linking them to the 
royal line or one of its collaterals'. As measures of contemporary status, the 
'great' aristocratic lines provided the standard against which prestigious descent 
could be compared. Under Salote, therefore, 'the official chiefly system reached 
a pinnacle of mystification during recent times' (Marcus 1989:201). 
But Salote' s command of the love and devotion of her subjects was not only 
a matter of her possessing impeccable genealogical connections, important as 
these were. From all accounts,.her personal attributes as a generous, honest, and 
caring monarch did as much to consolidate the position of the monarchy as any 
other single factor. She was devoted to many welfare measures, and took a 
special interest in women in this respect as well as in education for girls. Public 
funds were used, not for personal benefit, but for the promotion of public goods 
in health, education, and other general facilities. Her knowledge of Tongan 
families and individuals extended to a personal interest in their problems. All 
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this was repaid · by an intense loyalty on the part of her subjects, probably 
unparalleled in any other part of the world. Her death in 1965 marked the end 
of an era which is widely regarded as Tonga's 'golden age'.  
Another feature of Salote' s reign was a conscious effort to insulate Tonga, 
socially and politically, from foreign influences. Given Tonga's geographic 
isolation, this was not especially difficult and, until the mid 1950s, the only 
physical means of contact with the outside world was a monthly call by a New 
Zealand banana boat (Hau' ofa 1978: 160). But while Salote guarded the mass of 
the Tongan people from the influences of alien cultures, it was a far different 
matter when it came to the education of her children. Her son and successor, 
Taufa'ahau Tupou IV, completed his early education in Tonga but went on to 
attend school at Newington College in Sydney. From there he entered the 
UniversityofSydney andcompleted thedegrees ofBA,LLB, thus becoming the 
first Tongan to graduate from a university (Taulahi 1979:10). 
In contrast with his mother, who undoubtedly believed that 'modernization 
and progress should be subservient to the continued vitality of Tongan tradition' , 
King Tauf a'ahau Tupou IV has been described as a radical modernist who has 
brought to the throne 'the seeds of political instability and change' (Campbell 
1992:79). Certainly, he has done much to bring Tonga in touch with 'modern­
ization' by opening Tonga to tourism and investment, encouraging the devel­
opment of telecommunications, and supporting improvements in international 
transport facilities (Marcus 1977:21 1 ). These benefits, however, do not yet 
extend throughout the islands. In an interesting comment on the isolation still 
experienced by outlying communities, a media report on the 1993 elections 
highlighted the surprise election of the only successful female candidate. The 
candidature of Mrs 'Ofa ki 'Okalani Fusitu'a, who was elected as a people's 
representative (PR) for the tiny Niuas islands of Niuatoputapu and Niuafo'ou 
(which lie in the far north of the Tonga group), went almost unnoticed until her 
electoral success was announced. One of the factors accounting for this was said 
to be poor communications: 'Niuatoputapu has a single radiophone with bad 
reception. The air service to Niuafo'ou has been cancelled since last October 
because of mango trees overgrown near the runway' (Fonua 1993b:22). 
There is no doubt, however, that Tonga has experienced considerable 
change in the years since Salote's death and the accession of Tupou IV. Apart 
from infrastructure improvements and the growth of services, business, invest-
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ment, trade, educational facilities, and increasing oontact with the outside 
world, there have also been substantial changes in political thinking on the part 
of a growing number of ordinary Tongans, though perhaps not in a way intended 
by Tupou IV. 
The Pro-Democracy Movement 
The Tonga Pro-Demoaacy Movement (PDM) is said to have originated as far 
back as the 1970s in a relatively haphazard manner as a loose association 
involving mostly university graduates of the University of the South Pacific and 
some civil servants (Helu 1992:145). Issues of ooncem during this period ranged 
over civil service salaries, irregularities in the oonduct of elections, the number of 
seats available to oommoners in the legislature, and inequities in the system of 
land distribution (Campbell 1992:81). From the 1970s, one df the most active 
individuals in the movement has been 'Akilisi Pohiva, a former teacher from 
Ha'apai who was first elected to the Legislative Council as a people's represen­
tative) in 1987. Before then, he had been involved in various issues surrounding 
the conduct of politicians and in a controversial cmrent affairs radio programme 
which critically scrutinized their activities. He was dismissed from his public 
service position in 1985 but later won an historic legal victory over the govern­
ment when he took oomt action and was awarded damages and costs for unfair 
dismissal and denial of free speedl (Pacijiclslands Monthly May 1991:t4i 
Pohiva and several associates had also launched a broadsheet called Kele 'a 
which raised political issues of public interest. In 1986, a whole edition of Kele 'a 
was devoted to a critical expose of overtime payments to parliamentarians and 
its revelations apparently produced widespread shock throughout the islands, 
especially when oourt action over the affair was initiated against all but three 
members of the Legislative Council (Campbell 1992:86). Helu says that the 
kind of information dispensed by Kele'a fell 'like seed on a hungry soil',  so 
receptive had Tongans become to this kind of critical journalism (Helu 1992:146). 
The elections which followed in 1987 saw a marked increase in the number of 
candidates seeking election; among these was Pohiva, who was elected as the 
third memberforTongatapu even though he was yet to be vindicated by the court 
over his dismissal. This election was also the first one in which political and 
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social issues took precedence over the more usual matters concerning local and 
kinship affiliations (Campbell 1992:88). 
The tone of debate in the new parliament differed markedly from previous 
years, much of it centring around the question of public accountability. In the 
course of these developments, Hills reports that a number of people's repre­
sentatives 'spoke in terms that were widely regarded as impolite and therefore 
un-Tongan, at least when used about nobles and ministers appointed by the 
Crown' (Hills 1991b:359). This comment again highlights the points made 
earlier about the ethos which continues to surround the ruling elite, and how 
traditional beliefs have survived to the extent that ministers and nobles have 
difficulty in accepting criticism and direct questioning as legitimate forms of 
conduct in the political sphere. One of the highlights of the period came towards 
the end of the 1989 session when an ad hoe walkout of the legislature was staged 
by all PRs present in the chamber after the number one PR for Ha'apai, Teisino 
Fuk:o, lost a proposal for the establishment of a standing committee to prepare 
financial statements for the Privy Council. On returning to the chamber, they 
came armed with two proposals: one to reduce the number of noble's repre­
sentatives, and another to increase the number of parliamentary seats available 
to PRs (Campbell 1992:89-90; Hills 1991b:360). Predictably, neither proposal 
succeeded in a chamber dominated by nine nobles' representatives and the 
king's twelve ministerial appointees, as against the nine PRs. 
Another prominent issue at this time included a major scandal over the sale 
of Tongan passports, many of them to Hong Kong businessmen and mainland 
Chinese, with lesser sales to South Africans, Libyans, Thais, and Filipinos -
including the notorious Imelda Marcos. The purpose of these sales had been to 
raise foreign exchange. Apart from the principle of selling Tongan nationality, 
however, Pohiva and others were concerned with where the money from these 
sales had gone. Pohiva's requests for information in parliament elicited little 
response and in late 1989 he undertook court action. Public support for Pohiva' s 
campaign was evident in an unprecedented street protest over the issue which 
attracted around two thousand people (Gittings 199 1 :  10-14 ). As a direct result 
of this action, the government was later to convene an emergency session of 
parliament for the purpose of passing retrospective legislation to legalize the 
sale of 426 passports, which effectively amended the constitution (Pacific Is­
lands Monthly May 1991 :14). The passport 'scandal' and other issues of gov-
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emment accountability dominated public political debate in the period leading 
up to the 1990 elections. 
A feature of the campaign for the 1990 elections was an active effort on the 
part of conservative forces to rally support - a move which had never really 
been necessary in previous years because of the lack of 'issue campaigning' 
mentioned earlier, but had started to emerge in 1987. By 1990 the need for the 
conservatives to strengthen their hand was becoming much more pressing, and 
there was an attempt to enlist church support on a platform of 'church and state' 
(Hills 1991 b:365). In another unusual development, the king made some public 
comments during the campaign about the dangers of the demands for change 
get�g out of control and the possibility of a coup d'etat (ibUJ.:366). Pohiva, who 
was seen as the greatest threat to the conservative regime, was accused of being 
a revolutionary and a communist This had the opposite of the intended effect, 
however, and he gained considerable mileage from the publicity which was 
reflected in his spectacular win as the number one PR for Tongatapu with around 
75 per cent of the votes cast in his favour (Campbell 1992:94). The overall 
election result for the PRs was something of a landslide in favour of the 
refonnists, especially in the Tongatapu and Ha' apai constituencies. In addition, 
one of the founders of Kele'a, 'Atunaisa Katoa, took the first seat for Vava'u 
(Hills 1991b:371). The 1990 election results therefore served to strengthen the 
claims of the group which, although not organized formally in any way, let alone 
as a political party, was by now taking on some characteristics of a formal 
political opposition (Helu 1992:147). 
Encouraged by these strong indicators of public support, the reformist lobby 
continued to press for change. The establishment of the pro-democracy movement 
(PDM) as a formal body was eventually achieved in August 1 992. According 
to its foundation chair, Father Selwyn 'Akau'ola, the purpose of the PDM was 
not to function as a political party, but to 'create an atmosphere where a dialogue 
by all interested parties could take place' (reported in Matangi Tonga, July­
August 1992, 7[4)]6 ). In the period leading up to the 1993 elections, a major 
conference with the theme, 'The Tongan Constitution and Democracy' was 
convened in Nuku'alofa in November 1992 to promote this sort of dialogue. For 
four days, Tonga's political system received the full critical attention of a wide 
range of contributors, including some important church leaders. Around 400 
participants, as well as a number of other observers, crowded into adjoining 
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rooms with closed circuit television, heard one Tongan church leader, the 
Reverend Siupeli Taliai of Tonga's Free Wesleyan Church, describe the 1 875 
constitution as 'ethically, criminally, and theologically barbaric' (Aiavao 
1 992:31 ). In his opening speech the Reverend Taliai elaborated: 
In our beloved Tonga today there is still structural injustice after a century 
of so-called constitutional rule. Political and economic power is concen­
trated in the hands of a tiny minority who are able to command financial 
rewards out of all proportion to their actual work. This is why the pmsuit 
of justice always labours wider the disadvantage of appearing subversive 
(reported in Senituli 1993:22). 
Many of the arguments supporting reform drew from Christian teachings 
about equality as well as secular notions of human rights, and were voiced in 
direct opposition to notions endorsing the sanctity of chiefs and the monarchy, 
as well as to older Christian ideas about power which had allowed early 
missionaries to portray the monarch as God's annointedleader(Garrett 1982:273) . 
. But to quote the Reverend Taliai again: 'The proclamation of the King as sacred 
in Clause 41 of the Constitution shows our heathen inclination, despite the fact 
that we are equal under the United Nations charter and in the face of God' 
(reported in Fonua 1992:9). Pohiva added his voice to the debate on the 
monarchy saying that since all other monarchies with absolute power had failed, 
the lessons of history indicated that Tonga's present monarchical system was 
also destined to fail in its present form. He added, however, that 'the monarchy 
which surrenders power is bound to continue' (Aiavao 1992:33). This last 
remark is in accord with a widespread desire among pro-democracy supporters 
to see the monarchy retained, but with substantially reduced political power. In 
this respect, pro-democracy advocates have affirmed their belief in a genuine 
constitutional monarchy rather than a 'constitution under a monarchy' (An 
expression used by Koloamatangi, 1 991 : 1 1 ). They believe that a system which 
elevates the monarch 'out of the legislature' ,  and gives him or her 'the dignity 
and ceremony of a head of state such as Britain's Queen Elizabeth', would 
provide the most effective remedy to the present problems (Aiavao 1992:32). 
One commentator has stated succinctly a major problem facing reformists in 
Tonga. Powles points out that the monarch has so far governed with 'a relatively 
benign and gentle hand' . He continues, however, that it is now 'a question as to 
how to protect the interests of the people against the possibility of a less 
enlightened and more interventionist ruler' (Powles 1992:8). 
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Apart from the substance of the matters discussed at this conference, which 
ranged over the full agenda of issues relating to the theme, the response from the 
govemmentindicatedincreasing tmease and defensiveness. This became manifest 
in a series of attempts at repression which included the refusal to permit any 
foreigners (including some of Tongan descent) to enter the country for the 
conference and instructions to the local government-owned radio station to 
prevent the broadcasting of any convention speeches or other news (Senituli 
1993 :22). In addition, it was reported that a number of plainclothes police were 
monitoring the conference, supposedly 'under cover'. The report stated, how­
ever, that 'because of the closeness of Tongan society everybody knew who they 
were' and that although they were there ' to intimidate by taking the names of 
those in attendance' ,  few took much notice (Tiffany 1993: 17). Initially, Prime 
Minister Baron V aea had indicated 1l:lat the government would take some part 
in the convention, but evidently changed his mind by early November when it 
was announced that the government would in fact boycott the gathering. 
These developments had followed on from a lively session of parliament 
before the convention. Referring to a report from the Tongan Department of 
Health, which indicated an increasing incidence of mental illness in thecowitry, 
Crown Prince Tupouto'a remarked that some PRs were clearly wibalanced and 
may have personality disorders. In elaborating his point, and citing Adolf Hitler 
as an example, the prince informed the legislature that: 'Personality disorders 
are characterised by the behaviour of a person who insists that he alone is right, 
and tries to win the rest of society to his way of thinking' .  When one of the PRs 
attempted to interject, he was pointed out as an example of the kind the prince 
was speaking of (ibid.: 1 8). This is not the first time that heated exchanges in the 
legislature had been reported. In an incident in the earlier life of the 1990-92 
parliament, members had been instructed to go outside and 'cool ofr. As the 
speaker, the Honourable Fusitu'a, followed Pohiva from the chamber, he 
apparently called out to the commoner: 'I'll kill you! What are you and how can 
a person likeyruchallen� me?'(quotedinPacificlslandsMonthlyMay 19'J1:14). 
There is little need to emphasize ooce again the mind-set which produced such a 
reaction. 
Another notable development on the conservative side of politics, just one 
month before the pro-democracy convention, was a meeting called by Prime 
Minister Vaea of cabinet ministers and the leaders of all Christian churches in 
Tonga. One of the issues discussed was the possible formation of a new political 
25 
party, to be called, somewhat perversely, the 'Christian Democratic Party' .  
More generally, the head of the government information unit, Eseta Fusitu' a 
(also an outspoken conservative and the wife of the Honourable Fusitu'a), 
announced that: 'Both the Ministers and the church leaders reiterated their 
belief that Tupou I's well-proven method of Church and State combining to deal 
with the affairs of the nation, was still the best method for Tonga' (Matangi 
Tonga September-November 1992, 7[5] :5). In another report, however, it was 
suggested that most church leaders were in fact unhappy with the idea of a party 
which combined government and church members and that many were concerned 
that the government was simply trying to use the church to further its own 
agenda. An outspoken critic of the government and a strong pro-democracy 
supporter, the Catholic Bishop Patelisio Finau, described the government's plan 
to form a political party using the churches as devious and manipulative (Pacific 
Islands Monthly January 1993: 19). Furthermore, it is evident from the number 
of church leaders speaking in favour of reform at the pro-democracy convention 
that the establishment had not been able to swing the churches solidly behind 
their cause. If anything, the opposite had become the case. 
In view of the government's attempts to institute a 'church and state' 
platform, thereby involving church leaders directly in the sphere of politics, it 
is ironic that some church leaders have had to defend the position they have 
taken in support of democratic reforms and their active involvement in the pro­
democracy movement The late Bishop Finau, for example, was explicitly 
criticized for his activities in this respect and for speaking out against what he 
saw as the injustices in the present political system. He was reported as clashing 
with both the king and Crown Prince Tupouto'a, who have apparently accused 
him of being 'a marxist and an agent of the pope' (Fonua 1991 :54 ). On another 
occasion, the bishop stated that although he did not believe the church should 
become involved in formal party politics, it nonetheless had a duty to concern 
itself with issues of social justice. In addition, he said that the church 'cannot 
unconditionally accept what the government says, but [has] to measure what the 
government does and help those without a voice' (quoted in Aiavao 1993:33). 
In a further comment on the problems posed by Tongan culture for reformist 
aspirations, the bishop argued that traditional attitudes to power were of the 
domineering kind with little or no recognition of consultation as a desirable 
practice. He added: 'This is not the way Christian power is meant to be and [so] 
there is a clash between our cultural way and Christian leadership' (ibid. :54). 
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Despite moves on both sides to institute more formal mechanisms of 
political organization, party organization was notably absent during the cam­
paign for the 1993 elections, which started shortly after the conference. As 
before, each of the candidates ran as an individual, although a number were 
clearly identifiable as pro- or anti-democracy supporters, and the pro-democ­
racy supporters ran more or less as a team in the Tongatapu constituency. A 
record number of 55 candidates contested the nine seats reserved for PRs, but 
pro-democracy supporters or sympathizers again proved the most successful, 
dominating the seats in Tongatapu, Ha'apai, and Vava'u. One report noted as 
significant the defeat of the outspoken pro-government member from Ha' apai, 
Viliami Afeaki (Morton 1993b: 1 1  ). The single PR returned for 'Eua, however, 
is a matapule and therefore predictably 'traditional' in his approach to politics. 
The other PR returned was the successful woman candidate from the Niuas 
mentioned earlier (see Fonua 1993a:20-22). Although virtually nothing was 
known about her views on the pro-democracy cause at the time of her election, 
there was no doubting those of one of her unsuccessful opponents, the sitting PR 
for the Niuas, Siaki Kata. An article published in the lead-up to the election 
reported that Kata was a firm supporter of the status quo, believing that there 
were no benefits to be gained from changing the constitution or curbing the 
power of the monarch. On the contrary, Kata proclaimed that: 'The people of the 
Niuas believe the King should have the power because he is a Christian and he 
knows what to do. In addition he was the first one to have the best education in 
Tonga' (Morton 1993a:13). 
The conservative reaction 
Both local and overseas press reports heralded the election results as a significant 
triumph for the refonnist cause. Pohiva certainly saw it in these terms, claiming 
that the results indicated a clear mandate for reform and conveyed an unambigu­
ous message along these lines to the government (quoted in Morton 1993b:l l). 
But conservative spokespeople could not agree. &eta Fusitu'a claimed that the 
result could as easily be interpreted as a victory for the pro-government camp 
because the actual votes cast - rather than the number of seats won - indicated 
a decline in support for the pro-democracy candidates since the last elections in 
the order of 6,000 votes (reported in Aiavao 1993:33). If anything reflected an 
indisputable increase in support for the conservative side, however, this was 
27 
manifest in the elections for the noble seats which took place a week before the 
election of PRs. Among the nine nobles elected were four new representatives, 
'all of whom seem[ed] more conservative than the ones they replaced' (Senituli 
1993:24). But in view of the overall results, there is little doubt that the reform 
mood among the commoners in Tonga had been maintained throughout the 
period since the 1987 elections. This was despite concerted efforts by conserva­
tive elements to widermine the pro-democracy movement and its aims before and 
dming the campaign. 
A prominent crtitic of the establishment, Professor Futa Helu of Tonga's 
Atenisi Institute5, said that in the period immediately following the November 
convention, Radio Tonga had been dominated by a Premier's Office program 
which dwelt at length on the evils of democracy. In what can only be described 
as an absurd attempt to impair the reformist cause, the programme actually 
pointed to the misfortunes of the modem Greeks - heirs to the original 
inventors of democracy -and made claims about the position of Greeks today 
as being confined to working in restaurants and related occupations (Helu 
1993a:43). The implication to be drawn from this was that a democratic heritage 
should be regarded as a distinct disadvantage and, presumably, that the Tongan 
tradition of authoritarian rule was much to be preferred. A further inference of 
the programme's message is that not all traditions are of equal value or intrinsic 
worth - an inference which, inter alia, supports nationalistic claims based on 
the relative merits of Tonga's own political traditions vis-a-vis those of the 
democratic West 
In other efforts to belittle the pro-democracy conference, the Honourable 
Fusitu'a was reported as saying that many of those in attendance were just 
'academics enjoying a bit of a holiday' and that 'the ripple' would fade quickly 
(Morton 1 993a: 13  ). A few days before the elections, Police Minister 'Akau' ola 
spoke on Radio Tonga about the implications of the pro-democracy demands. 
He warned explicitly about the dangers of 'rebellion',  stating that acts of this 
kind included promoting hatred of the monarch and government, conducting 
protest marches, and bringing in foreign doctrines (Morton 1993c: 13). He also 
reminded listeners that it was an offence to destabilize the state and challenge 
the authority of the king, and that the penalties for treason included the death 
sentence. The government-controlled station also replayed a speech given by 
Queen Salote calling on Tongans to uphold their traditions (Aiavao 1993:33). 
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Shortly after the Honourable 'Akau'ola made his remarks, however, Prime 
Minister Vaea contradicted him to the extent of saying that the pro-democracy 
movement was free to air its opinions (Morton 1993c: 13). In another report on 
the elections, Helu wrote that Radio Tonga broadcasts during the three days 
before the elections consisted of an 'orchestra of denunciation' ,  a bombardment 
of 'reactionary and· antidemocratic propaganda' ,  and 'inflated and terrorising 
rhetoric' (Helu 1993b:23). After the elections, Pohiva stated that at meetings 
with electors during the campaign, some nobles had claimed that the introduction 
of democratic reforms would lead to the removal of the king, that people would 
lose their land, and that Tongan customs and traditions generally would be 
affected for the worse (Morton 1993c:13). 
The government's stance on the reforms espoused by the pro-democracy 
movement - a stance which amounted to unconditional support for the status 
quo - remained unchanged after the elections. Indeed, their position was 
explicitly reaffirmed in a unequivocal statement issued by Prime Minister Vaea 
who was reported as saying, in effect, that: 'Tongan people did not want 
democracy ... they liked having aneliteleadershipdrawnfromnoble background 
... [and] were quite happy living with their traditions and accepted the role of 
hierarchy' (Morton 1993b: l2). Afurtherreportcarried in the local press quoted 
another government minister, the Honourable Ma'afu Tuku'i 'aulahi, on his 
reaction to suggestions that the nobles' seats be either abolished or elected by 
the people. According to the Honourable Ma'afu, the best solution for Tonga to 
such proposals was to adopt Mao Tse Twig's view of power, namely, that it 
'comes out of the barrel of a gun' . He continued: 
We are a warring people and if you are talking about power, then we are 
talking about war .... It is absolutely unrealistic to think that you could talk 
your way in and take away the power of the nobles or the government 
without any violent confrontation, it is unheard of, it has never happened 
.... If you want power you have to fight for it (Matangi Tonga March-April 
1993, 8[1] :23). 
Oddly enough, ideas relating to this theme have also been used by pro­
democracy supporters. One speaker at the November conference, prominent 
Tongan academic Epeli Hau'ofa of the University of the South Pacific, recalled 
that Taufa'ahau was not the heir to the Tu'i Kanokupulo title, but had achieved 
it through conquest, thereby earning recognition of his leadership ability. 
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Hau,ofa went on to point out that Taufa'ahau,s introduction of hereditary 
positions such as those created for the nobles had put an end to competition -
an end which also heralded 'the beginning of weakness and the llllfit' (Hau'ofa 
1992: 12). Rather than endorsing violent warfare as a means of legitimate 
competition, though, Hau'ofa,s position undoubtedly reflects the characteriza­
tion of modem democratic politics in terms of a competitive, but non-violent, 
struggle which has been expressed as the reversal of Clauswitz's famous 
dictum, that politics is the prosecution of war by other means (see Sartori 
1987:42). 
Another general line of argument used by conservative opponents of the 
reform movement draws on relativist arguments concerning the merits, or 
demerits, of democracy. An interview with Eseta Fusitu'a on the subject of 
contemporary political developments in Tonga elicited the following views on 
the constitution and democracy: 
A constitution embraces the fimdamental features of a COlllltry, when it 
does not, that country is in trouble. When you talk about this so-called 
democracy you are talking about a model associated· with a western 
society. The Westminster model in India makes no provision for the 
multiple religions there, so the model remains but the society suffers. 
In Samoa, one of the original drafters (of the constitution), Jim Davidson, 
was conversant with Samoan society, so the constitution stipulated only 
Samoan matai (chiefs) could vote and only matai could be candidates. Put 
that Samoan model against the Australian model and they,11 say 'bad, 
bad' . The 1991 constitutional change (giving adult Samoans universal 
suffrage but only permitting matais as candidates) is not entirely 
Westminster, but still reflects Samoa, and that's the way it should be. Our 
Tongan parliament was meant to refl� om multiple criteria for leadership 
- age, seniority and traditional leaders. If you look at that with palagi 
eyes we'll never understand each other (Islands Business Pacific Decem­
ber 1992:33-34). 
The latter point emphasizes the especially problematic view of a particular 
culture as something which is enclosed in a falsely abstracted horizon. Put 
simply, it denies the possibility that all 'alien horizons' are open to understand­
ing. It is for this reason that diverse thinkers have been sharply critical of the 
'myth of the framework' - the myth which insinuates that 'we are forever 
enclosed in our own horizons, our own paradigms, [and] our own cultures' 
(Bernstein 1983:143, 167). 
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Finally, it is worth recording here the views of Prince Fatafehi Tu'ipeiehake, 
younger brother of the king and prime minster of Tonga for over twenty-five 
years until his retirement in 1991.  Responding to a question on whether he 
supported the theory that cabinet would be stronger if its members were elected 
by the people, the prince indicated his opposition to the idea. His reason for 
supporting the present system? The belief that very few people had a sufficient 
or clear understanding of what goes on in the world beyond Tonga. 'Our local 
politicians are only good enough within Tonga, when we move out to the 
international arena ... the best approach for government [is] to call in only our 
capable people' (Pacific Islands Monthly October 1991 :14). And in answer to 
a further question on the best possible political system for Tonga: 
One thing that we should always remember is that no-one else knows what 
is best for us other than ourselves. We all talk about democracy but we do 
not know what it looks like. It has a different shape and a different colour 
for different countries ... Here it is different, people are just going about 
their daily lives, and when the breadfruit is in season they are very happy. 
I do not know what [you] would call that, carefree or whai but you can't 
ta1k to people like that about democracy (ibid.:15). 
The clear implication of these remarks is that commoners have neither the 
political skills nor the wisdom, nor even the potential, to participate at a higher 
level of responsibility than that accorded by the present constitution. It follows 
that these qualities are believed to be the preserve of a ruling class which alone 
carries in its royal or noble blood lines the requisite capacity to serve as leaders 
in government. Nor is there any faith in the judgement of the common people 
to select leaders or choose between policy alternatives put forward by groups 
competing for power. Attitudes of this kind may be held sincerely, or may be 
prompted simply by a desire to maintain the status quo for self-interested mo­
tives. Either way, there is little reason to expect that people holding such 
perspectives on politics can be persuaded to reverse their views in the immediate 
future. And since the ruling class, which is evidently imbued with these views, 
holds all the power, the prospects for change do not seem imminent. 
Conclusion 
The activities of the pro-democracy movement may not yet have achieved 
anything in the way of tangible political reform, but they have certainly brought 
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into the open many of the attitudes and perspectives characterizing both sides of 
the debate about political change in Tonga - a debate which is readily charac­
terized in terms of tradition versus democracy. The reformist challenge, which 
has been carried forward in a framework of W estem democratic norms and 
hwnan rights principles, is clearly anathema to the present incumbents whose 
legitimacy and authority ostensibly derive from blood lines reaching back into the 
remote past, and through which flows the essence of Tongan 'tradition' . It is in 
this sense, broadly speaking, that tradition and democracy are construed as 
opposing forces in a situation of changing political dynamics. Quite apart from 
the practical institutional refonns that must accompany moves to greater democ­
ratization, the pro-democracy movement clearly has a very difficult battle ahead 
in confronting fixed attitudes and challenging conventional wisdom about the 
legitimate source of political authority. 
The discussion in this paper has made clear the necessity for the movement 
to overcome deeply entrenched normative beliefs about the structure of 'tra­
ditional' society and the values embodied in it. The development of democratic 
norms relating to a faith in the innate capacity of common people to exercise 
political judgement, as well as to perform the duties of political office, has been 
inhibited by the pervasive influence of a longstanding social system which does 
not recognize this capacity, let alone the political rights which are presumed to 
underscore it. As suggested in the foregoing discussion, the cluster of values 
which are at the core of this social system are expressed in the differential 
qualities deemed proper to two distinct classes of people. In Tonga, this system 
has been depicted as demanding a morality of talangofua. (obedience), of mateaki 
(loyal)character,of'ofafonua Ooveoftheland) andofangalelei(goodbehaviour) 
on the part of the tu 'a (commoner). For the upper strata, a quite different set of 
qualities is expected, including to a (bravery ),fa 'a (prowess ),fie 'eiki ( chiefliness) 
andfiepule (dominance). Thus the values embodied in the two sets of expec­
tations have produced two opposed moralities, with one being completely 
subordinate to the other (Kolo 1990:3). The moralities are nonetheless symbi­
otic or at least complementary - thus neither has any real meaning unless it is 
understood in opposition to the other, and the negation of one logically entails 
the negation of the other. 
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It is further suggested that the corpus of Tongan myths, the talatapu 'a, 
function ideologically to fortify the oppressive elements of Tongan society. In 
illustrating this point, Kolo outlines the political dimensions of the talatapu 'a: 
Many of the talatapu'a can be said to be aristoaatic in nature; they deal 
with aristocratic figures and views. Tu� are expected to believe that events 
told in these myths are actualities and historically true. In ceremonial 
speeches, we speak mythologically and symbolically, paying our utmost 
respect to the chiefly classes, the Kings and the Queens (ibid.). 
This interpretation of the way in which myth is presented, and the function 
that it can serve, feeds back into the general idea that an historically situated 
notion of culture, expressed through the concept of a society's unique traditions, 
can serve as an ideological buttress to the power and privilege of traditional 
elites in a modem context This is despite the fact that the conditions under 
which power configurations were originally developed and sustained, and under 
· which the legitimating ideologies emerged and became assimilated as part of the 
culture, have undergone radical changes (see Keesing 1991 :4). 
Just as circumstances change, so too can attitudes - even those most 
ardently and passionately held. This is most clearly evident in the revolution in 
thinking on the part of Tongan commoners which has taken place over the last 
few years. Helu maintains that the present situation would have been unthinkable 
twenty years ago. Given that Tonga had 'the most severely conservative culture 
this side of the equator' ,  the extent and openess of the criticism now being 
directed at the highest established authorities represents an extraordinary 
turnaround in the way that people think (Helu 1992: 142). One of the few things 
that remains unchanged, however, is the desire of the elite (like the desire of 
elites almost everywhere) to maintain power even in the face of compelling 
demands for reform. These demands reflect a global backlash against all manner 
of authoritarian rule and, although few have been as benign as Tonga's, the 
political system there has increasingly acquired the characteristics of an 
anachronism. As one commentator has put it, Tonga is at risk of becoming 'a 
country of primarily antiquarian interest' . He continues, however, that while 
Tonga's people do prize much of their history and value the elements of culture 
which make them distinctive, they would not wish to become an animated 
museum of anthropology (Hills 199 1 a: 10). 
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Notes 
1 See Marcus 1989, especially pp.189-190. The 'stranger-king' phenomenon was evident not 
only in Tonga, but throughout other parts of Polynesia. 
2 The term does not necessarily imply enforced obedience since it also encapsulates a sense of 
obligation based on loyalty and devotion. I am grateful to Barbara McGrath for pointing this 
out 
3 The missionary papers of Reverend Peter Turner indicate that he chose the name George at bis 
baptism in 1831 'because he said he heard so many good things spoken about of the good King 
of England and he wished to imitate him' (see Cummins 1972:61). 
4 'The Code of Vava'u' is reproduced in Cummins 1972: 105. 
5 The Atenisi Institute, of which Helu is both founder and director, is a liberal arts institution 
which operates in accordance with a philsophy of education and an emphasis on critical 
thinking going back to the ancient Greeks (the name Atenisi is itself a Tongan rendering of 
Athens). In this respect it stands out as an unusual institution not only in Tonga, but in the South 
Pacific generally (seeMatangi Tonga January-February 1992, 7(1] :10). 
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